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A Short Introduction
to Agamben’s ‘Beyond
Human Rights’
In discussions 
about ‘makeability’
or social engi-
neering, speciﬁ-
cally when they 
concern manage-
ability and biopoli-
tics, references are
often made to the 
ideas of philoso-
pher Giorgio 
Agamben. Open is 
republishing his key 
1993 text ‘Beyond 
Human Rights’, 
with an introduc-
tion by philoso-
pher and jurist 
Marc Schuilenburg. 
According to 
Schuilenburg the
ﬁgure of the homo 
sacer that Agamben 
presents in this and 
other writings leads 
to many misunder-
standings. He also 
addresses the differ-
ences in Agamben’s 
ideas about 
biopolitics and 
those of Foucault.
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In 1993, Giorgio Agamben (b. 1942), 
an Italian political philosopher at 
the University of Verona, published a 
text about the status of the refugee,
‘Beyond Human Rights’, in which he
links the issue of refugees with human
rights. The ﬁrst article of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights 
incorporates the motto of the French
Revolution (liberté, égalité, fraternité): 
‘All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience
and should act towards one another 
in a spirit of brotherhood.’ Yet while 
the article speaks of ‘human beings’, 
Agamben argues that human rights are 
not compatible with ‘the human’, the
merely alive, as such. In the case of the 
refugee, his or her political and legal 
status is considered a temporary state, 
Agamben writes in ‘Beyond Human 
Rights’. Having arrived in another 
country, he or she, following a positive 
assessment by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, is subjected to 
all sorts of control mechanisms (citizen-
ship exams, shaking hands, language 
tests, etcetera) intended to turn him
or her into a ‘full-ﬂedged citizen’. 
Goodbye refugee, welcome citizen.
To Agamben, the treatment of 
refugees demonstrates how modern 
politics work. According to Agamben, 
who is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced in this
by Michel Foucault, life is dominated 
by biopolitics, which he deﬁnes in his 
book Homo Sacer as ‘the assimilation 
of natural life in the mechanisms and 
calculations of state
power and poli-
tics’.1 Power over
life is not exercised in this by a sover-
eign ruler; statistics are used as input 
for the actions of the government.
To Agamben this biopolitics did not 
originate around the mid-eighteenth
century, as Foucault writes in The Will 
to Knowledge (1976); it is at least as old 
as Western political history. As far back 
as the Ancient Greeks a distinction was
made between ‘the human’, which was
called simple or natural life (zoè), and 
a ‘qualiﬁed life’ by which the speciﬁc
form of life or lifestyle of an individual
or group (bios) was meant. Neither is 
biopolitics based on an optimization 
of the conditions of life in order, as 
Foucault asserts, to control the ‘body as
a type’ through all manner of measures
in the area of public health, dietary 
customs, housing, immigration, but 
rather, Agamben writes, on ‘life that is
has been excommunicated’, in order 
to ‘indicate the boundary that connects
and separates what is inside and what 
is outside’.2 Ulti-
mately Agamben’s view of biopolitics 
remains strongly focused on a general 
legal argument (which, with his notion
of a ‘state of exception’ furthermore
plays out largely on the politico-con-
stitutional level of the nation-state).
Foucault, on the other hand, breaks 
with a legal consideration of power 
and mixes biopolitics with disciplinary 
exercises of power actualized in local 
practices in a ‘particular period, in a 
particular country, 
as a response to 
particular needs’.3
According to Agamben, the position
of the refugee coincides with that of the
homo sacer, a ﬁgure in Ancient Roman 
1. Giorgio Agamben, De 
soevereine macht en het naakte 
leven (Amsterdam: Boom/
Parrèsia, 2002), 9, 129.
2. Ibid., 142.
3. Michel Foucault, Ervar-
ing en waarheid (Nijmegen:
Te Elfder Ure, 1985), 85.
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law whom anyone could kill without 
committing a murder (in the legal
sense). Agamben sees the ambiguity 
contained in this deﬁnition in the status 
of the refugee. Although he or she is
a living being, he or she has far fewer 
rights than the citizens of nation-states. 
This cancels out the principle of the 
equality of all human beings as sentient 
beings. Human rights, Agamben writes,
are not capable of bridging the gap
between the two ‘forms of life’. Accord-
ing to Agamben, and in this he follows
Hannah Arendt, the expression ‘birth’ 
in the ﬁrst article of the human rights 
declaration coincides with ‘citizenship’. 
The consequence of this analysis is that 
there is no longer any room for merely 
being alive, the most elementary char-
acteristic of any living being. Life is con-
sequently absorbed in abstract variables 
called ‘nation-state’ or ‘society’ or ‘law’
or ‘citizen’ (and so forth). From this
perspective, human rights turn out not 
to be genuinely universal, but in fact 
the property of citizens.
This does not mean that the refugee 
is outside society. He is assimilated as 
an element within society (just as the 
outlaw is always ‘in the law’). The set 
‘outside-inside’ (inclusion and exclu-
sion) cannot be reduced to a binary 
dichotomy. Both forms make people
part of a homogeneous and unifying
whole that explains nothing in itself, 
but rather is constantly being rede-
ﬁned. Agamben calls this the ‘inclusive 
exclusion’ of bare life with the social
form of life (bios). In the terms used 
by French philosopher Alain Badiou: 
‘being human’ has become here an
intensional collection characterized 
by the unifying and reducible prin-
ciple of citizenship. In the process 
human rights conceal from us those 
individuals and groups who are not 
represented by these rights, that is to 
say people whose legal status has not 
fully been resolved. In Roman times, 
the homo sacer could not, under any 
circumstances, live in the city of the 
citizens. He was driven out (like the 
illegal refugee today) to the margins 
or the ‘black holes’ of society, situated 
far from the sight of the average city 
dweller. Today the refugee also appears 
as a margizen, whose life is qualitatively 
distinct from that of the citizen and of 
a temporary resident (denizen).4 He or 
she is a person who
has no access to the
collective goods
and services of our
society (security,
insurance, work,
etcetera).5
The ﬁgure of 
homo sacer leads to 
many misunder-
standings. Isn’t 
everyone a homo
sacer: criminals, 
gays, squatters, the 
mentally handi-
capped, feminists, 
the unemployed, 
beggars, the home-
less, addicts, artists? 
Even American neo-Republicans, Slavoj 
Žižek once told his audience, refer, to 
Agamben’s great chagrin, to the fact 
that they lead a life that is steadily being 
marginalized. Although Agamben 
writes that ‘today a clear ﬁgure of the 
4. A denizen is a person 
who maintains close links 
with a country without 
being a citizen of it. Not 
only does he or she live 
there, he or she also 
speaks its language, has 
had children there, has 
a job or goes to school 
there. Until the nine-
teenth century the term
was used for a foreigner 
who was assigned the 
status of a subject by the 
king through ‘letters of 
charter’. The longer they 
remained legally in the 
country the more rights
these persons obtained, 
becoming semi-citizens or 
denizens. Ultimately deni-
zens had fewer rights than 
citizens but more rights
than foreigners.
5. Marc Schuilenburg, 
‘Citizenship Revisited:
Denizens and Margizens’,
Peace Review – A Journal of 
Social Justice, 20, 3, 2008,
forthcoming.
The Refugee as Homo Sacer 89
homo sacer no longer exists’, he names 
several concrete examples of what 
he means by ‘bare life’ in his unﬁn-
ished series of works devoted to the 
ﬁgure of the homo sacer. In addition to 
the refugee, he talks about the issue 
of euthanasia and the fate of coma 
patients. And in State of Exception he
addresses the position of captured 
Taliban ﬁghters at Guantánamo Bay.6
With powerful 
words he equates 
the legal posi-
tion of the Jews in the concentration
camps with those of the ‘detainees’
of Guantánamo, who are being held 
without any form of trial and without 
charge. The prisoners have the status 
of ‘enemy combatants’, a category that 
does not exist in international law, so 
that they are not covered by the Geneva 
Convention on the protection and 
treatment of prisoners of war.
What now? In ‘Beyond Human 
Rights’ the phrase ‘a coming political 
community’ is formulated, a notion 
that Agamben had already cautiously 
addressed in his article about the 
student uprising at Tiananmen Square 
in Beijing in 1989.7 What this com-
munity looks like
remains very vague.
It is clear, however,
that Agamben, in 
the parts of the homo sacer cycle that 
have yet to be published, intends to
make it a ﬁeld of study, a potentiality 
that breaks through the prevailing order
and coherence and makes a connection 
to other elements, ‘beyond’ the point at 
which every living being is turned into a 
controlled and manageable object.
6. Giorgio Agamben, State 
of Exception (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 3-4.
7. Giorgio Agamben, The 
Coming Community (Min-
neapolis: The University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003), 
85-87.
